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THE SUPREME COURT AS CIVIC EDUCATOR:




Recent analyses of the First Amendment free speech opinions of
the Rehnquist Court have confirmed that decisions in this area of the law
contradict the traditional ideological labels that scholars and other Court
commentators routinely use to describe the Justices. However, Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy, whose opinions defined much of the Rehnquist
Court's speech jurisprudence, is still described in terms of his First
Amendment 'libertarianism.' In this article', I argue that this approach
provides an inadequate understanding of this aspect of the judicial
decision making of the Justice who is now the sole occupant of the
'swing' seat on the Roberts Court. Kennedy is a free speech libertarian.
Rather than describing his opinions in terms of this ideology, however,
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1. This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the 2007 Annual
Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, and draws on material from
THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY M. KENNEDY ON LIBERTY (Rowman
& Littlefield, forthcoming 2008). I would like to thank Eugene Volokh and Art
Ward for their excellent comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article. I
am also grateful for feedback received from Nigel Ashford, Randy Barnett, Jolly
Emrey, Jim Schmidt, and Mark Silverstein; and for the research assistance provided
by the staff of the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress. Much of the
analysis in this article was undertaken while I was a 2006 Institute for Humane
Studies Summer Graduate Research Fellow, and research at the Library of Congress
was funded by an Institute for Humane Studies Hayek Fund for Scholars Grant.
we should focus on the goal of civic education that he uses his judicial
opinions to achieve.
Kennedy's interest in civic education became publicly apparent
in 2001 when, in collaboration with the American Bar Association, he
created the Dialogue on Freedom. The principles of this extrajudicial
program are inextricably intertwined with Kennedy's jurisprudence. In
the area of expressive freedom, the importance of civic education can be
2
seen in the Justice's opinions in Texas v. Johnson, Rosenberger v.
3 4
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., and Hill v. Colorado. In each
case, Kennedy authored an opinion that passionately defended the civic
educational value of maintaining viewpoint diversity.
To substantiate my conclusions I draw on Justice Kennedy's pre-
and post-confirmation speeches, and the papers of Justice Harry
Blackmun. Parts I and II provide analysis of Kennedy's goal of fostering
civic education. In Part III, I then discuss the chosen cases, which all
demonstrate the Justice's ability to achieve his goal, whether writing for
a five-justice majority or on his own in concurrence or dissent. In each
of these cases Justice Kennedy passionately defends the First
Amendment's strong restrictions on viewpoint discrimination. He does
so using language designed to achieve a civic educational goal, the
significance of which has heretofore been overlooked by scholars of his
jurisprudence.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT-"AN AMERICAN DOCTRINE"
"[T]he first amendment is not the preserve of a particular political
enclave. It is not a liberal doctrine. It is not a conservative doctrine. It is
an American doctrine."5
It is now well established that the United States Supreme Court
during William Rehnquist's tenure as Chief Justice was "divided" in
such a way that cases could be neither accurately predicted nor
2. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
3. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
4. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
5. Burt Neubome, First Amendment, 6 TOURo L. REv. 113, 130 (1989).
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adequately analyzed using the labels "conservative," "liberal,"
"Democratic," or "Republican." The differences that generated
jurisprudential disagreements were far more complex than these
ideological/partisan political terms suggest.6  As scholars now reflect
upon the First Amendment free speech legacy of that Court, it has
become clear that Justice Anthony Kennedy became the Court's
dominant voice in free speech cases upon the retirement of Justice
William Brennan in 1990.
7
Data about Justices' voting patterns leave us with little doubt that
"unadulterated support for freedom of expression is hardly the lodestar of
liberalism assumed by political scientists." 8 This was particularly true
for the divided Rehnquist Court.9 Justice Kennedy, who is generally
considered a conservative justice, 10 was the most libertarian member of
that Court in free speech cases. He voted against the government in
almost three quarters of those cases. Justices Clarence Thomas and
David Souter also had a libertarian bent to their free speech
6. See MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE
FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005).
7. BURT NEUBORNE, Free Expression and the Rehnquist Court, in THE
REHNQUIST COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 15 (Martin H. Belsky, ed., 2002) ("where
free expression is concerned, it would probably be more accurate to call it [the
Rehnquist Court] the Brennan/Kennedy Court") (alteration added).
8. Lee Epstein and Jeffrey A. Segal, The Rehnquist Court and the First
Amendment: Trumping the First Amendment?, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 81, 109
(2006).
9. Not only did the Rehnquist Court generate free speech decisions whose
patterns of voting belied traditional "conservative" and "liberal" labels, but also far
more than its predecessors it heard and resolved "value-conflict" cases-involving
expressive freedom and other constitutional values-in favor of the litigants who
brought the free speech challenges. Id. at 93.
10. Although, it should be noted that scholars and journalists have described
Justice Kennedy's conservatism in numerous ways. For example, see EARL M.
MALTZ, Anthony Kennedy and the Jurisprudence of Respectable Conservatism, in
REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COuRT DYNAMIC 140 (Earl M. Maltz, ed.,
2003); DAVID G. SAVAGE, Anthony M Kennedy and the Road Not Taken, in A YEAR
AT THE SUPREME COURT 35, 46 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas, eds., 2004)
(describing Kennedy's conservatism as Reagan era conservative "idealism");
Terence Moran, Kennedy's Constitutional Journey, LEGAL TIMES, July 6, 1992, at 21
("a conservatism of character more than one of ideology..."); Richard C. Reuben,
Man in the Middle, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, October, 1992, at 36 ("small-town,
traditional-values conservatism...").
jurisprudence, but statistically they trailed Kennedy by a long way-in
speech cases they voted to protect the individual's rights about sixty
percent of the time. At the other end of the spectrum were Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Stephen Breyer, who supported the individual's
position in only forty percent of cases." Quite clearly, these patterns
cannot be explained by using "liberal" and "conservative," or
"Democratic" and "Republican" labels. These data suggest that while
there emerged a majority of the Court committed to the Constitution's
libertarian protection of speech, describing this coalition12 of justices in
terms of "conservatism," "liberalism," or even "libertarianism" is, on its
own, not very helpful. However, we cannot take ideology out of the
equation entirely. After all, when the Framers wrote that "Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech," they drew on an
ideology-a "set of [consistent] idea-elements."' 13  Therefore, it is
inevitable that the Justices who interpret this clause will make
ideological decisions.' 4 Understanding these decisions, however, requires
us to realize the very real "limitations of labeling."' 5
Justice Kennedy's freedom of expression jurisprudence is a case
in point. Several scholars have remarked that the Justice has struck a
decidedly libertarian tone in speech cases. 16 As I have argued elsewhere,
11. The following are the percentages of decisions in which members of the
Rehnquist Court took the speech-protective position (1994-2002 Terms): Kennedy
74.5%; Thomas 61.1%; Souter 61%; Stevens 55.7%; Ginsburg 53.6%; Scalia 49.6%;
O'Connor 44.7%; Rehnquist 41.8%; Breyer 39.7%. Compiled using data from
Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994-2002, available
at http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/howvoted.htm (updating Eugene Volokh, How
the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994-2000, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1191
(2001)); Epstein and Segal, supra note 8, at 93.
12. My use of this word is not meant to suggest that the majority of justices
who usually took the speech-protective position always consisted of the same
individuals, because it clearly did not.
13. John Gerring, Ideology: A Definitional Analysis, 50 POL. RES. Q. 957,
980 (1997).
14. Eugene Volokh, The Rehnquist Court: Pragmatism vs. Ideology in Free
Speech Cases, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 33, 34 (2004).
15. Lawrence Friedman, The Limitations of Labeling: Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy and the First Amendment, 20 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 225 (1993).
16. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Libertarian-Lite Constitutional Order
and the Rehnquist Court, 93 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1049 (2005) (describing Kennedy's
free speech opinions as "strikingly libertarian"); Thomas W. Merrill, The
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and as the analysis below indicates, this is an accurate 
description.17
However, just like 'conservative' and 'liberal,' there is a certain amount
of definitional baggage attached to 'libertarian.' And Kennedy has
expressed his discomfort at the tendency to attach ideological labels to• • 18
his jurisprudence. Therefore, in order to tease out of Kennedy's
opinions his commitment to the libertarian principles written into the
speech clause of the First Amendment, we have to understand the goal
that he pursues through these writings.
This article explains that the goal pursued by Kennedy is to use
the Court's opinions as tools of civic education. This argument is
demonstrated through analysis of Justice Kennedy's opinions in Texas v.
Johnson,19 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 20 and
Hill v. Colorado. As we will see, fostering civic education in these
cases involves writing opinions that clearly and concisely articulate the
boundaries of the constitutionally protected liberty to express oneself
free of government restrictions based on one's point of view.
II. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CIVIC EDUCATIONAL DIALOGUE
Although it is difficult to determine how Justice Kennedy
defines "civic education," the following definition given by Ira Strauber
is broadly representative of Kennedy's views, and it helps us to identify
some of the recurring themes explored below. First, in the context of the
law, civic education is comprised of "the lessons that litigation,
adjudication, and commentary are supposed to teach about the
conservation or, alternatively, the transformation of law, policies, and
Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting, Purchasing, and Possibly Condemning
Tobacco Advertising, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1143, 1169 (1999); Mark Tushnet,
Kormendy Lecture Series: Understanding the Rehnquist Court, 31 OHIO N.U. L.
REv. 197, 199 (2005) (discussing Kennedy's "libertarian inclinations" in First
Amendment opinions); Volokh, supra note 14, at 41 (Kennedy is "broadly speech-
libertarian").
17. KNoWLES, supra note 1.
18. Jason DeParle, In Battle to Pick Next Justice, Right Says Avoid a
Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2005, at Al.
19. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
20. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
21. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
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culture in a liberal-democratic polity. ' 22  Second, it involves an idea
"both within and-equally important-outside law school ...that all
those who engage in constitutional and legal commentary thereby help to
articulate competing visions of lawmaking that are essential to building a
vibrantly free political community.
This commitment to active engagement of the legal community
in civic educational endeavors has been clear throughout Kennedy's
career. For many years prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court,
Kennedy taught constitutional law classes at McGeorge School of Law in
his hometown of Sacramento (including during his time as a member of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals). Upon his appointment to the
Supreme Court, in a farewell speech Justice Kennedy told his McGeorge
students "I hope I've been able to teach you that rules alone don't make
the law and that knowledge of the rules doesn't make you a lawyer.,
24
On several occasions, Kennedy has been criticized for allowing his
decision making-and, by association, his views on the Court's civic
educational role-to be unduly influenced by the legal educational
profession for which he clearly has such respect. His critics contend that
this profession does not represent the views of mainstream American
society.25 However, as Kennedy has said, it is his judicial experience
22. IRA L. STRAUBER, NEGLECTED POLICIES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
LEGAL COMMENTARY AS CIvIC EDUCATION 17 (2002) (emphasis in original).
23. Id.
24. Quoted in Moran, supra note 10, at 21. Student law review notes
demonstrate this, Kennedy has written, because they show "in real and concrete form
the principle that members of the bench and bar are but temporary trustees of a law
that must soon be entrusted to a new generation." Anthony M. Kennedy,
Introduction, 25 PAC. L.J. xiii (1993) (emphasis added). As Kennedy explained
during his Supreme Court nomination hearing, "the legal profession is the only
profession that is intimidated by its initiates. We have law review articles written by
students who are not even lawyers and they get paid a great deal of attention;" this
could only be positive because "I guess that is one thing that keeps the law vigorous
and vital." Confirmation Hearings on the Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to Be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 88, 164, 177 (1987) [hereinafter Kennedy Hearings].
25. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas J., dissenting) ("Today's opinion is the product of a
Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to
the so-called homosexual agenda ..."); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652-53
(1996) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas J., dissenting) ("When the
2008] CIVIC ED UCA TOR
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that has taught him "that constitutional doctrines of the next generation,
though announced by the federal courts, are first tested in the crucible of
the classroom., 26  So, while law schools should not be the only
intellectual stimuli, it is also true that debates about fundamental
constitutional principles should not be left to the devices of "normal
political debate and resolution. '' 27 With regard to the First Amendment, it
is particularly important to keep this in mind. The community that civic
education encourages will be more restricted, and less vibrant, if its
participants do not understand, and are therefore unable to respect, the
proper constitutional boundaries for the expressive freedom that the
Constitution establishes. As Kennedy has written, "speech is the
beginning of thought.,
28
A. The Dialogue on Freedom-The Concept
Justice Kennedy's passion for civic education became publicly
apparent in an extrajudicial setting after the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001. In response to those events, he created a program called the
"Dialogue on Freedom," a program designed to encourage student
discussion of civic participation and democratic values. The goal was
Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than the
villeins-and more specifically with the Templars, reflecting the views and values of
the lawyer class from which the Court's members are drawn .... This law-school
view of what 'prejudices' must be stamped out may be contrasted with the more
plebeian attitudes that apparently still prevail in the United States Congress, which
has been unresponsive to repeated attempts to extend to homosexuals the protections
of federal civil rights laws .... "); Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Professor
Sways Justice Kennedy, CHI. SuN TIMES, September 4, 1992 at 33 (accusing
Kennedy, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992), of succumbing to the lobbying and influence exerted by Harvard Law
Professor Laurence Tribe).
26. Anthony M. Kennedy, Judge, Address before the Sacramento Chapter of
the Rotary (February 1984), in Committee on the Judiciary, Judiciary Nominations
files, A. Kennedy, Sup. Court, 100th Congress, Records of the Senate, Record Group
46, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
27. Antonin Scalia, The Judges Are Coming, CONG. REC. 18921 (1980)
(objecting to twentieth century changes in legal education that resulted in
"substantial doses of 'policy analysis'-intensive examination of the social
desirability of each rule of law").
28. Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002).
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"to foster among our nation's youth the identification and understanding
of fundamental American values and those universal moral precepts that
all free people share. 29 Administered by the American Bar Association
(reflecting Kennedy's belief that "the bar ought to step up from time to
time and say there are certain values that unite us"3°), dialogues have
been established at schools across the nation, with students and
prominent judges and politicians engaging in the discussions envisioned
by Kennedy. Students are asked to think about how they would address
the disparities between their American political and cultural beliefs, and
those held by three individuals in the fictional country of Quest, where
there is very high unemployment, the few people who do work are paid
very low wages, and the government is dominated by corruption.
Students discuss the anti-American, religious and political doctrines of
Drummer, the most charismatic speaker in Quest. And they are asked to
formulate responses to the hostility towards Western values exhibited by
two citizens of Quest-W and M.
31
The program has a goal of creating unity, not division. It seeks
to celebrate and promote an understanding of the "rights and
responsibilities that are universal," rather than to generate "a series of
little debates" from which might emerge a relativistic attitude to cultural
32and political values.
B. The Dialogue on Freedom-And Justice Kennedy's Jurisprudence
A few commentators have taken notice of this initiative, but they
have not argued that it can inform our understanding of Kennedy's• • 33
jurisprudence. This is an unfortunate oversight because the notion of
29. Dialogue on Freedom Summary, available at http://www.abavideonews.or
f/ABA243D/DOF summary.html.
30. Charles Lane, Attacks Led to 'Dialogue 'for Justice Kennedy, WASH. POST,
January 26, 2002, at All (quoting Justice Kennedy).
31. Dialogue on Freedom Hypothetical, http://www.abanet.org/dialogue/whati
s.html.
32. Id.
33. See TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 172-73; Tony Mauro, A Lost Chance to Be
the Chief, LEGAL TIMEs, March 7, 2005, at 1 (implying that the significance of the
program lay in the "quality time" it allowed a prospective chief justice to spend with
First Lady Laura Bush); Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Leader: The Arrogance of Justice
Anthony Kennedy, NEW REPUBLIC, June 18, 2007, at 21-22.
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civic education that the program embodies began to inform his decision
making much earlier than September 11, 2001. As Judge Alex Kozinski,
Kennedy's close friend and former clerk, has remarked: "There are those
who might say the [Dialogue] is corny or hokey, but it's really him."34
At the inaugural Dialogue on Freedom, at the School Without
Walls in Washington, D.C. in January 2002, Justice Kennedy observed,
"Governments are most dangerous when they try to tell people what to
think., 35 One might wonder how a Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, a federal government employee, can legitimately take the
normative position that governments should not be in the business of
attempting to direct our thoughts. How, it might be asked, can Justice
Kennedy say this while at the same time advocating a dialogue on
liberty, the constitutional boundaries of which are delineated by the
Supreme Court. The answer lies in the libertarian and expressive
freedom principles underpinning the statement. The civic educational
goal of Justice Kennedy's free speech opinions is achieved in the
following way. The First Amendment preserves and protects a
marketplace of ideas, and the Court defends this marketplace. The result
is a citizenry exposed to a multiplicity of views-an enlightened
citizenry that is best positioned to ensure the individual liberty (speech-
related or otherwise) of all its members.
There are several reasons why this is the case. For example, we
can look to the general educational value of providing people with the
greatest possible access to diverse knowledge and opinions. James
Madison expressed this view in 1822, in an oft-quoted letter to William
T. Barry:
A popular government, without popular
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.
Knowledge will for forever govern ignorance.
And, a people who mean to be their own
34. Charles Lane, Justice Kennedy's Future Role Pondered, WASH. POST, June
17, 2002, at Al (quoting Judge Kozinski).
35. Amy Goldstein & Charles Lane, At D.C. School, Justice Kennedy and
Teens Explore U.S. Values, WASH. POST, January 29, 2002, at A17 (quoting Justice
Kennedy). I am particularly grateful to my fellow 2006 Institute for Humane Studies
Summer Graduate Research Fellows for their input on interpreting this quotation.
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Governors, must arm themselves with the power
which knowledge gives.
36
Madison recognized, just as he had a generation earlier in The
Federalist No. 10, that people do not all think alike. "The latent causes
of faction," he wrote, "are ... sown in the nature of man.",
37 This means
that extinguishing factions is equivalent to extinguishing our natural
liberty. The correct remedy for factions is more factions. Similarly, the
correct way to combat the speech one does not like is to put forward an
alternative view.
When we apply this to the First Amendment, we arrive at the
recognition that embodied in its speech provision is the important need to
prevent such suppression by the government because of the element of
distrust that underpins the Constitution. An informed citizenry is vital
for understanding this part of individual liberty. There are two reasons
why both of them are evident in Justice Kennedy's libertarian free
speech jurisprudence. First, because order and liberty can peacefully
coexist, some legitimate constitutional restrictions on speech can be
imposed. And because "[i]t is emphatically the province and the duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is,"
'38 the responsibility for
articulating these limitations, as they are defined by the text and
principles of the Constitution, falls to the Justices of the United States
Supreme Court, including Anthony Kennedy. Second, an awareness of
these speech boundaries helps to overcome what Randy Barnett
describes in The Structure of Liberty as a "pervasive social problem"-
the problem of knowledge.39 While we all have personal knowledge that
is unique to ourselves, we must never lose sight of the fact that at the
same time we all have personal knowledge that we might value equally.
Therefore, when we make use of our knowledge we must do so with the
36. Letter from James Madison to William T. Barry, (Aug. 4, 1822), in JAMES
MADISON: WRITINGS 1772-1836 790 (1999). For analysis of the letter as a
Madisonian expression of the importance of education, see Michael Doyle,
Misquoting Madison, LEGAL AFF., July/Aug. 2002.
37. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), THE FEDERALIST BY
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON AND JOHN JAY 131 (Benjamin F. Wright,
ed., 2002).
38. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (alteration added).
39. RANDY BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY-JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF
LAW (1998).
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awareness that we are ignorant of so much of the knowledge and
opinions of others. This immediately suggests that collective and social
decisions (such as those made by groups of political decision-makers)
should not be grounded in perceptions that the negative effects of an
action or view warrant prohibiting or suppressing it. Of course, this
might prompt one to reply that every action negatively affects something
or somebody. It might also be said that there will always be dissenters
from some views. That this is true therefore requires (for the ultimate
preservation of liberty) some determination of the legitimate restrictions
on speech and conduct.
40
It would be wrong to state that a democratic government of
limited powers can legitimately respond to citizens' claims and concerns
if it delineates the nature and boundaries of the claims and concerns that
it hears. Similarly, it would be misleading to state that the corollary of
this is the argument that we should place our trust not in the
government's but rather in the citizens' expressive judgments. One need
not follow this to its logical conclusion to see the problems associated
with, as Richard A. Epstein has described it, relying on the "good
citizens to reach the right result every time.",
41
C. An Educational Institution?
It obviously takes some effort to know what one's First
Amendment rights are. The text of the Free Speech Clause might seem
simple, but only Justice Hugo Black read "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech" to mean "no law.",42 If "a debate [is]
structured by a familiar framework"-education breeds this familiarity-
then "many people who otherwise would have to invest too much of their
time or other resources in order to join" that debate might well choose to
express themselves, relatively safe in the knowledge that their speech
40. Id. at 29.
41. Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 41, 54 (1992).
42. Smith v. Cal., 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). And, even Black's absolutism was tempered by a firm distinction between
speech and conduct. See generally MARK SILVERSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITHS:
FELIX FRANKFURTER, HUGO BLACK, AND THE PROCESS OF JUDICIAL DECISION
MAKING (Cornell University Press) (1984).
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43
will not be subject to government penalties. Judicial opinions represent
one means of disseminating this knowledge. 44 The idea of judges-
particularly the men and women who sit on the Supreme Court-using
their opinions in a civic educational manner has endured some
criticism. 45 However, Eugene V. Rostow's famous description of the
Court as "an educational body, and the Justices are inevitably teachers in
a vital national seminar" expresses a sentiment that scholars are more
46
likely than not to agree with. Even though they disagree about the
specific normative details of this view of the Court, law professors and
political scientists alike endorse it in larger debates about the role of the
Court in a constitutional democracy.47
What about the empirical side of the discussion, however? What
if the Court holds "vital national seminars" that no one attends? Does
the American public find it necessary to engage in civic education in
order, for example, to maintain the country's commitment to democratic
43. SAMUEL P. NELSON, BEYOND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE POLITICS OF
FREE SPEECH AND PLURALISM 18 (2005) (alteration added) (emphasis in original).
44. Justice Kennedy has passionately expressed his belief that while teaching
the public about the work of the Court is a vital national goal, it is not a goal that
should be achieved by televising the Court's proceedings. "We are judged by what
we write, in the federal reports," he argues. "We have a timeline, a language, a
grammar, an ethic; an etiquette, a formality, a tradition that is different from the
[televised] political branches." Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Testifies
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Judicial Independence & Security, (C-
SPAN television broadcast Feb. 17, 2007).
45. Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw.
U. L. REV. 145, 176 (1998) (Klarman is skeptical about the educational value of
opinions interpreting the Constitution's abstract language.).
46. Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66
HARv. L. REV. 193, 208 (1952). Christopher Eisgruber accurately captured
academia's reaction to Rostow's description when he wrote that "an astonishing
range of thinkers has endorsed some version of this idea." Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 961, 962 (1992).
47. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 26 (2d ed. 1986) (as an authoritative "voice of the
Constitution," the Court is an "educational institution that both takes the observation
to correct the dead reckoning [of the past] and makes it known" to future generations
(alteration added)); James E. Fleming, The Constitution Outside the Courts, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 215 (2000); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY
FROM THE COURTS (1999); Mark Tushnet, Style and the Supreme Court's
Educational Role in Government, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 215 (1994).
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self-government? And, regardless of the answers to these questions,
does the Court actually play any role in the distribution of this
knowledge? In other words, "Does the Court . ..have an educative
responsibility, or does it instead merely have an occasional educative
effect as a by-product of interpretive accidents? '48 Scholars have been
reluctant to address the empirical questions raised by the concept of the
Supreme Court as a civic educator. This is because it is not at all clear
that there is an identifiable group of students that either wishes to be, or
actually is, being civically educated by the nine Justices in Washington,
D.C. Were Justice Kennedy to answer these questions, I suspect that he
would identify a judicial role that lies somewhere in between
"responsibility" and "effect." Even though Kennedy frequently
expresses the belief that because "[t]he law lives in the consciousness of
people," it would be undemocratic to think that "government is for
experts," I suspect that he is under no illusion that the average American
49is listening to what he says.
This begs the question: Just how educationally useful are his
opinions? In other words, can the Court really be considered a civic
educator if there exist few people with either an interest in or a concern
about furthering their knowledge of constitutional principles as the
Supreme Court articulates them? Robert F. Nagel rejects the argument
that "fancy talk"--discussion of high free speech principles-educates
the public about the proper boundaries and content of a constitutional
right. Rather, he states, such rhetoric merely confuses the average
citizen:
48. Eisgruber, supra note 46, at 963-64, 1014. Eisgruber specifically stated
that he was not addressing the empirical question whether or not the Court's
educative opinions actually do educate.
49. Justice Kennedy quoted in Federal Judges Convene Civic Education
Summit, 34 THE THIRD BRANCH (2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jul
y02ttb/convene.html (alteration added).
50. Robert F. Nagel, How Useful Is Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69
CORNELL L. REv. 302 (1984). Discussing Justice Brennan's opinion in Texas v.
Johnson, Eisgruber makes a similar point: "Saying that Brennan does not provide
the American people with arguments likely to motivate them to do what is right is
quite different from saying that Brennan does not clearly describe what the
American people ought to do." Eisgruber, supra note 43, at 985 and 981-985
generally. On Kennedy's opinion rhetoric, see Akhil Reed Amar, Justice Kennedy
and the Ideal of Equality, 28 PAC. L.J. 515, 516 (1997); TUSHNET, supra note 6,
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A public exposed to the judiciary's lessons will
inevitably ask certain troubled questions. Why, for
example, if the first amendment's guarantee of
freedom of speech is so important, is it so often
invoked to protect seemingly silly, unsavory, or
dangerous activities? Why does its application so
often seem strained, difficult, and doubtful?
5'
If the public response to a Court decision was to ask such
questions, Nagel argues, it would "ultimately undermine public support
for the idea of free speech., 52 As we will see below, these criticisms are
quite inconsistent with the principles that underpin the Constitution's
protection of expressive freedom. For reasons that will become clear, in
America's constitutional democracy the role of the Supreme Court is not
determined by the extent to which there is majoritarian agreement about
the Constitution's content. And the inquiries of which Nagel speaks (and
the civic educational dialogue that they would generate) should be
encouraged rather than channeled into a dead-end street.





There are many ways in which the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence distinguishes between types of speech. The
Court has never placed all expression into a single category, and it has
never applied one standard of review to all utterances and/or expressive
activities. The three cases analyzed below were chosen for their ability
to explain Justice Kennedy's pursuit of the goal of civic education in a
particular area of First Amendment free speech law-viewpoint
discrimination. Before proceeding to an analysis of the opinions in
at170-71, 78; Tushnet,Style and the Supreme Court's Educational Role in
Government, supra note 47, at 219.
51. Nagel, supra note 50, at 329.
52. Id. at 329-30.
53. "[E]ducating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at
its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as
mere platitudes," W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)
(alteration added).
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Texas v. Johnson, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
and Hill v. Colorado, it is important briefly to understand the two main
reasons why Kennedy's commitment to the use of opinions to foster
54civic education is so evident in viewpoint discrimination cases.
The first reason is reflective of just what viewpoint
discrimination is, and why it is almost always afforded the "most
exacting scrutiny" by the Court.55 One of the most prevalent defenses of
government actions that restrict expression based on the speaker's views
rests on the fear of the "communicative impact" of speech. The two
most common types of communicative impact are (1) audiences having
"undesirable or unlawful" reactions to the speech and (2) audiences
56reacting because material offends them. A government that decides to
restrict speech because of such fears demonstrates very little trust in its
citizens' personal responsibility or levels of tolerance. The Framers
certainly recognized the fallibility of humans and knew that it was
unrealistic to expect individuals to act responsibly, and to tolerate their
fellow citizens at every turn. Their solution was to establish a system that
limited the actions of the government; they did not envision a set of
paternalistic restrictions on individuals' thought processes. Justice
Kennedy shares the Framers' commitment to the fundamentality of the
principles of personal responsibility and tolerance. Therefore, it is no
surprise that in his First Amendment jurisprudence he places great
emphasis on educating people about the importance of preventing the
government from discriminating against speech because of a speaker's
views.
The second reason for the choice of cases reflects the educational
benefits that the Justices expect the public to receive from exposure to
the speech protected by the First Amendment. It is doubtful, for
example, that the majority of people who choose to watch pornography
do so because it might change their views about the content of the
material or about pornography in general. For example, the Court has
54. I am very grateful to Eugene Volokh for prompting me to consider this
issue.
55. Simon & Schuster v. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 125 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
412 (1989)).
56. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 189, 212-16 (1983).
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said adults have a constitutional right to watch "sexually-oriented" cable
television programs at any time during the day (as opposed to only at
nighttime, when the risk that children will be exposed to the broadcasts is
significantly reduced). When they said this, the Justices were probably
not concerned with furthering the nation's civic education about the
boundaries of First Amendment liberty." They were not, in other words,
seeking to encourage people to watch pornography because it might
enlighten them as to the merits of certain sex acts.
A. Texas v. Johnson
Justice Kennedy endorsed a civic educational understanding of
the Court's role in one of his earliest Supreme Court opinions.
Described by him as "a great teaching case" because "[i]t teaches that the
Constitution has meaning in your own times, 58 Texas v. Johnson
involved constitutional questions about which few people had heard or
strongly held a view. 59 During a political demonstration outside the 1984
Republican National Convention in Dallas, Gregory Lee Johnson set fire
to an American flag. Nobody was injured, but several onlookers later
testified that they were "seriously offended" by the incident. One person
returned to the site to collect the remains of the flag; he took them home
and buried them in his backyard. The offense that Johnson's actions
generated was sufficient to convict him under a Texas statute making it a
crime to "intentionally or knowingly desecrate . . . a state or national
flag." The State defined 'desecrate' as to "deface, damage, or otherwise
physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend
one or more persons likely to observe or discover his action.,
60
The five-Justice majority that voted to strike down the Texas law
on First Amendment grounds was composed of Justice Brennan (who
wrote the opinion), Justices Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun,
Antonin Scalia, and Kennedy. Although he joined Brennan's opinion
57. U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment, 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
58. The Role of the Judiciary in Promoting the Rule of Law, (C-SPAN
television broadcast 2005) (alteration added).
59. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). For an extensive treatment of the public and political
reaction to the case, see ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, FLAG BURNING AND FREE
SPEECH: THE CASE OF TEXAS V. JOHNSON (2000).
60. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 400 n. 1.
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"without reservation, Kennedy chose to write a short, two-page
concurrence that was a rather extraordinary display of what he has since.. .. • .. • • ,,62
described (somewhat apologetically) as 'judicial hand-wringing.
Even though Justice Kennedy has since suggested that he should
not have searched his soul in quite such a public fashion, there remains
no doubt that his concurrence in Johnson serves an identifiable civic
educational purpose. Examining some of the changes that the opinion
underwent demonstrates this. The first draft contained passages that
expressed the Justice's disdain for Johnson's actions. However, as Table
1 shows, the language of the second and final version was noticeably
toned down. Perhaps this was in response to comments from Justice
Blackmun, whose marginalia on the first draft include objections to
certain phrases that did not appear in the final opinion. More
importantly, it was probably in recognition of the essential First
Amendment principles of tolerance and viewpoint diversity at stake in
the case-the principles that Kennedy feels it is important to convey to
the American public. In the second draft, Kennedy inserted language
reflecting the elements of individual liberty that are central to his
63jurisprudence.
Kennedy wrote, "[T]he flag is constant in expressing beliefs Americans
share, beliefs in law and peace and that freedom which sustains the
human spirit." Originally, Kennedy referred to beliefs "all Americans
share." The removal of "all" from his final opinion marked his
awareness that the beliefs to which he was referring were not and should
not be interpreted as the beliefs that a majority hold; in the eyes of the
Constitution, it was just as American to burn the flag as to wave it.
64
Indeed, in the final opinion Kennedy took pains to emphasize that this
was not a case in which the Justices could allow their decision to be
61. Id. at 420 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
62. Jeffrey Rosen, The Agonizer, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 11, 1996, at 82
(quoting Justice Kennedy).
63. Texas v. Johnson, Justice Kennedy concurrence, first and second drafts,
Box 533, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C. [hereinafter HAB-LOC].
64. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 421 (Kennedy, J., concurring). As Justice Brennan
wrote for the Court in Johnson: "We can imagine no more appropriate response to
burning a flag than waving one's own .. " Id. at 420.
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affected by their "distaste for the result." 65 Doing so would result in
"undermining a valued principle that dictates the decision. 6 6  He
respected the passionate, and heartfelt dissenting objections of his
colleagues--Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Byron White, John
Paul Stevens, and Sandra Day O'Connor-but wrote: "I do not believe
the Constitution gives us the right to rule" in this way, "however painful
this judgment is to announce." 67 Barely one year earlier, at his Supreme
Court nomination hearing, then-Judge Kennedy reminded the Senate
Judiciary Committee that the First Amendment "ensures the dialogue
that is necessary for the continuance of the democratic process. 68
Johnson emphasized that Kennedy believes that this dialogue is based
upon the idea of tolerating even those views given with "vengeful
insolence.,
69
While it might be true that "the authors [of concurrences] keep a
careful eye on their own judicial identities to assure they remain intact
for future battles, 7 ° it is misleading to view Kennedy's Johnson
concurrence in this manner. 7 Rather, the opinion illustrated that his First
Amendment jurisprudence cannot be correctly labeled as 'conservative'
or 'liberal' because this is not the way in which he views the principles
embodied in this first section of the Bill of Rights. Johnson stood for the
65. Id. at 420.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 421 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68. Kennedy Hearings, supra note 24, at 111.
69. Texas v. Johnson, Justice Kennedy concurrence, first draft, Box 533,
HAB-LOC, supra note 63.
70. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric:
Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1371, 1415 (1995) (alteration added). See also
R. Dean Moorhead, Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 38 A.B.A. J. 821, 882
(1952) (arguing that separate opinions can provide significant information about
appellate judges). This sentiment was reflected in much of the newspaper coverage
of Johnson, which emphasized the "personal toll" aspects of Kennedy's concurrence.
See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5-4, Back Protesters' Right to Burn the Flag,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1989, at Al. A notable exception was Al Kamen, Court
Nullifies Flag-Desecration Laws, WASH. POST, June 22, 1989, at Al (picking up on
the key First Amendment sections in the opinion).
71. To use the apt phrase coined by Justice Ginsburg (when she was a member
of the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit), Kennedy's opinion did not constitute a
"solo performance." Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65
WASH. L. REv. 133, 143 (1990).
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principle that the special protection of individual liberty afforded by the
First Amendment's free speech provision involves issues divorced from
either conservatism or liberalism. Concededly, they were "libertarian"
issues, but more importantly they struck at the heart of what it meant to
maintain the vitality, vibrancy, and progress of democracy through
"rational public discourse., 72
It took Kennedy only six short paragraphs to explain why he felt
compelled to write separately in Johnson. He wrote to defend the Court's
protection of the First Amendment, "a pure command of the
Constitution," a goal he said it achieved by striking down "a clear and
simple statute" that conflicted with it.73  The brevity of Kennedy's
opinion was important. It enabled him to avoid negatively affecting
judicial collegiality.74 More importantly, though, its conciseness made it
a stronger vehicle for civic education. When major national newspapers
chose to publish excerpts from the case, there was room to print
Kennedy's concurrence in its entirety. 75 And in such a short opinion it
72. Anthony M. Kennedy, Assoc., J., U.S. Sup. Ct., Speech at the American
Bar Association Annual Meeting 2 (Aug. 9, 2003, rev. Aug. 14, 2003) (paginated
transcript available from the Public Information Office, U.S. Sup. Ct.) (copy on file
with author).
73. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
74. Michael Traynor, Judge Richard Arnold: His Collegiality and Concurring
Opinions, 58 ARK. L. REv. 545, 553 (2005) (If "a short [concurring] opinion ...
tactfully makes a useful point ... it certainly seems worth considering whether such
a contribution has such independent value that it should not be discounted by some
perceived diminishment in collegiality .... ) (alteration added).
75. For example, see Excerpts of Opinions from Supreme Court Decision in
Texas v. Johnson, WASH. POST, June 22, 1989, at A8; Excerpts from High Court's
Decision Barring Prosecution in Flag Protest, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1989, at B8.
The argument that Kennedy's concurrence in Johnson serves a valuable civic
educational purpose is supported by the fact that the opinion does not fit comfortably
into any of the traditional categories of concurrences identified by the most
prominent literature on this subject. See Lori Beth Way & Charles C. Turner,
Disagreement on the Rehnquist Court: The Dynamics of Supreme Court
Concurrence, 34 AM. POL. RES. 293, 298-299 (2006). The opinion is partly
consistent with the authors' "signaling" category of concurrences, because Kennedy
used it to send a message to the Court's audiences; however, what Kennedy clearly
did not do was to use this writing to express a desire to revisit an issue in the future,
which is the other characteristic of a "signaling" concurrence. Similarly, one might
argue that it was a "preserving" opinion because it "does not challenge the majority
opinion." However, it would be wrong to place Kennedy's Johnson concurrence in
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was very difficult for the fundamental principles to get lost. One could
clearly see the forest and the trees-or, to put it another way, the flag did
not obscure the First Amendment.
B. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.
Six years later, there could be little doubt that Justice Kennedy
was a free speech libertarian. Some of his earlier First Amendment
opinions suggested that what is now a clear commitment to limiting
government regulation of expression took some time to evolve.76 This
was perhaps because it took several terms for Kennedy to reach a certain
level of comfort with the power of the institution of which he was now a
part. 7  However, Kennedy made it particularly obvious from the
beginning of his tenure that he was not willing to tolerate any decision
that provided the government with an opportunity to engage in content-
78based restriction of speech. His opposition to such restrictions was
this category because it is not an example of a "justice .. .not engag[ing] in any
jurisprudentially or politically significant behavior." See also Pamela C. Corley,
Concurring Opinion Writing on the Supreme Court 23-28 (2005) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Georgia State University) (on file with Georgia State University
Library) (Corley codes six types of concurrence; Kennedy's separate writing in
Johnson does not fit the description of any of these).
76. See Friedman, supra note 15.
77. See Moran, supra note 10; Reuben, supra note 10. This conclusion is
consistent with the findings of Albert P. Melone, because although Professor Melone
concluded that Kennedy did not confirm the "freshman effect" hypothesis (that
during his or her first few terms on the Court a justice is unlikely to desire to-and
probably will not-write prominent and/or controversial opinions, especially
dissents), it is clear that Kennedy's faith in using the power of the Court did accrue
over time. Albert P. Melone, Revisiting the Freshman Effect Hypothesis: The First
Two Terms of Justice Anthony Kennedy, 74 JUDICATURE 6 (1990); Richard Brust,
The Man in the Middle, 89 A.B.A. J. 24, 25 (Oct. 2003) (quoting former Kennedy
clerk Michael Dorf: Kennedy is "probably the most confident of all the justices in
the court's power.").
78. The only exceptions are when the expression falls into a very small number
of "historic and traditional categories long familiar to the bar .... " Simon &
Schuster v. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment). In this case, the Court unanimously concluded that New York's
"Son of Sam" law was unconstitutional. The law's requirement "that an accused or
convicted criminal's income from works describing his crime be deposited in an
escrow account" and "made available to the victims of the crime and the criminal's
2008]
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evident in 1995, when he wrote for the five-Justice majority in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va. 79 The case involved
an example of viewpoint discrimination, which Kennedy described as "an
egregious form of content discrimination.
80
In Rosenberger, Kennedy was responsible for retaining the votes
of four colleagues. 81 In this respect, the opinion differed from Johnson,
in which Kennedy wrote for himself alone. This did not mean, however,
that the Rosenberger opinion lacked the civic educational language of his
separate writings. This rhetoric was clearly evident in a case whose
details presented the Justice with a perfect opportunity to emphasize why
he believed the boundaries of constitutionally protected free speech must
be drawn to foster diverse views.
In 1990, Wide Awake Productions (WAP) applied to the
University of Virginia's Student Activities Fund (SAF) for money to
fund the publication of Wide Awake, a magazine of Christian viewpoints.
Unlike the groups that produced the Journal of Law and Politics, the
Loki Science Magazine, the Virginia Literary Review, and numerous
other student publications, WAP was denied funding. 82 The University
granted it the Contracted Independent Organization status it needed to
other creditors" was a content-based regulation of speech, and the governmental goal
was a "compelling state interest" but the method was not narrowly tailored to
further that goal. Id. at 108, 116, 123. Kennedy wrote separately to explain why,
given the egregious nature of the violation of freedom of expression that was the
New York law, it was "unnecessary" and indeed "incorrect" to apply even the strict
level of judicial scrutiny that the compelling interest test represented. Explaining
that the origins of the test lay not in First Amendment jurisprudence but rather in the
Court's body of decisions about equal protection of the law, Kennedy argued that it
"has no real or legitimate place when the Court considers the straightforward
question whether the State may enact a burdensome restriction of speech based on
content only ...... Id. at 124. To be sure, as every constitutional law student
knows, there are certain categories of content-based speech that fall beyond the
protection of the First Amendment, but Kennedy saw no need to add to them using a
test producing results akin to "ad hoc balancing." Id. at 127.
79. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
80. Id. at 829.
81. That Justices O'Connor and Thomas both wrote separate, solo
concurrences suggests Kennedy may have had to work quite hard to retain their
votes.
82. For a list of the publications that were funded, see Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 271 n3 (4th Cir. 1994).
[Vol. 6
apply for the funding. This meant that the University did not consider
,,83
the group a "religious organization. However, SAF funding was
denied because the production of Wide Awake was judged to be a
religious activity, and therefore unrelated "to the educational purpose of
the University [of Virginia]. 84 The University guideline denying funding
for the publication of Wide Awake was struck down, on viewpoint
discrimination grounds, by a bare majority of the Supreme Court.
85
WAP was formed by a group of undergraduates who wished
"[t]o publish a magazine of philosophical and religious expression" in
order "[t]o facilitate discussion which fosters an atmosphere of
sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian viewpoints" and "[t]o provide a
unifying focus for Christians of multicultural backgrounds., 86  As
Kennedy observed during oral argument in Rosenberger, "[T]he
university can say that these are not educational activities, and draw the
line there." However, it engages in unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination and deprives people of an opportunity to hear, and
educate themselves about different ideas and perspectives-goals at the
very heart of the raison d'etre of a college or university-when it
"draw[s] the further line that discussion of abstract views of religion is
also prohibited.
' 87
In cases that involve discrimination based upon either the
content or the views of a particular expression, the civic educational
value of Kennedy's opinions is immense. This was particularly clear in
Rosenberger, where Kennedy took care to underscore the viewpoint
diversity that colleges and universities, as seats of learning, are intended
to foster. When The New York Times reported the decision in
Rosenberger, it printed only two passages-both from the same
83. During the litigation that resulted from the funding denial, the University
never claimed that WAP was such a group. A "religious organization" is defined in
the University's Guidelines as "an organization whose purpose is to practice a
devotion to an acknowledged ultimate reality or deity." Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at
826.
84. Id. at 824-25 (alteration added).
85. The Court also held that this free speech conclusion was consistent with
the requirements of the Establishment Clause. The focus here, however, is on the
expressive freedom aspect of the decision.
86. Id. at 825-826 (alterations added).
87. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (No. 94-329) (alterations added).
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section-of Kennedy's opinion.88  It would be wrong to draw
conclusions about the public impact and dissemination-and therefore
the educational value-of opinions based upon excerpts in one national89
newspaper. However, the choice of selections tells us much about the
ability of Kennedy to grab the attention of the Court's audiences by
paying special attention to the educational setting of the case. Here, it is
worth reprinting the section containing these passages:
Vital First Amendment speech principles are at
stake here. The first danger to liberty lies in
granting the State the power to examine
publications to determine whether or not they are
based on some ultimate idea and, if so, for the State
to classify them. The second, and corollary, danger
is to speech from the chilling of individual thought
and expression. That danger is especially real in
the University setting, where the State acts against
a background and tradition of thought and
experiment that is at the center of our intellectual
and philosophic tradition. In ancient Athens, and,
as Europe entered into a new period of intellectual
awakening, in places like Bologna, Oxford, and
Paris, universities began as voluntary and
spontaneous assemblages or concourses for
students to speak and to write and to learn. The
quality and creative power of student intellectual
88. Excerpts from Supreme Court's Ruling on Religious Magazine, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 1995, at A24. This apparent neglect was largely because more
attention was devoted to two other cases decided on the same day as Rosenberger:
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). In fact, most major newspapers tended to focus on
the religious aspects of the decision. For example, see Editorial, Church and State
United, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 8, 1995, at A10; Laurie Goodstein & Joan
Biskupic, In Two Rulings, High Court Refines Relationship between Church, State,
WASH. POST, June 30, 1995, at Al; Linda Greenhouse, Ruling on Religion, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 1995, at Al.
89. This approach may also raise the controversial issue of the "Greenhouse
Effect," a trend toward liberalism in some Justices. For an excellent analysis of this
phenomenon, see LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE
ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 118 (2006).
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life to this day remains a vital measure of a
school's influence and attainment. For the
University, by regulation, to cast disapproval on
particular viewpoints of its students risks the
suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in
one of the vital centers for the Nation's intellectual
life, its college and university campuses. 9°
These words provide us with an excellent indication of the civic
educational goal that Justice Kennedy pursues. Recall that the second
component of the definition of civic education that I use in this article
deals with "engag[ing] in constitutional and legal commentary" in order
"to articulate competing visions of lawmaking that are essential to
building a vibrantly free political community." 91 In Rosenberger, Justice
Kennedy emphasizes that this commitment cannot be impeded. The First
Amendment need to limit discriminatory government action is most
urgent in this case, says Kennedy. This is because the desire to prohibit
dissemination of certain views occurs in a "political community" that is
located within the confines of a state institution that is "among the
Nation's oldest and most respected seats of higher learning."
92
As Justice Kennedy explained, the University was creating a
dangerous environment of intolerance. A policy of denying funding to a
group that writes about an "ultimate idea," would, if applied consistently,
he wrote, "bar funding of essays by hypothetical student contributors
named Plato, Spinoza, and Descartes"--not to mention the treatment that
would be accorded "undergraduates named Karl Marx, Bertrand Russell,
and Jean-Paul Sartre."93 Kennedy drew to a close the free speech portion
of his opinion by pointing out the absurdity (and the dangers) of
disqualifying "any manifestation of beliefs in first principles. 94 Plato
would be free, he wrote, "to submit an acceptable essay on making pasta
or peanut butter cookies, provided he did not point out their (necessary)
• ,.. • ,,95
imperfections.
90. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(citations omitted).
91. STRAUBER, supra note 22, at 17 (alteration added).
92. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823.
93. Id. at 837.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 836-37.
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C. Hill v. Colorado
Justice Kennedy has a clear jurisprudential commitment to
protecting individuals' freedom to express themselves by limiting
government efforts to regulate the content of their speech. Can the same
be said, however, about his approach to cases involving individuals who
do not wish to be spoken to? This question was confronted in Hill v.
Colorado, decided in 2000. 96 In his lengthy dissenting opinion,
Kennedy's understanding of whether we have a right not to be spoken to
is defined by the responsible way in which individuals are required to
exercise their liberty, considering the consequences of their actions for
others.
In Hill, Kennedy dissented from Justice Stevens's majority
opinion upholding a Colorado law that established 100-foot zones around
"heath care facilities." These were zones within which a person was
prohibited from "knowingly" coming within eight feet of another person,
without their consent, "for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to,
displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling
with such a person .... ,, 9 7 The Court held that this was a content-neutral
statute because it did not regulate speech; it only regulated "the places
where some speech may occur." 98 Unlike the refined rhetoric of his
concurrence in Johnson, the passion that oozed from Kennedy's dissent
in Hill was exhibited in expressions of contempt for the damage that the
First Amendment had sustained at the hands of the Justices who voted to
uphold the Colorado statute. Kennedy argued that the majority's opinion
relied on a flawed and frightening interpretation of constitutionally
protected free speech principles.99
There are two ways in which Kennedy's dissent furthered his
civic education goal. First, it clearly targeted a much larger audience
than the group of colleagues with whom he disagreed. Over the years,
several members of the Supreme Court have noted the positive
contributions that dissenting opinions can make to democratic discourse.
This discourse is both inevitable and encouraged, because resolution of
96. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
97. Id. at 707, n. 1.
98. Id. at 719.
99. Id. at 776 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
one particular instance of constitutional litigation rarely brings to a close
discussion of the questions that the case raised.' 00 The Justices have also
recognized the educational value of dissents, °10 as well as the
philosophical similarities that exist between protecting the First
Amendment in the name of a "marketplace of ideas" and expressing
judicial disagreement in order to "contribute to the integrity of the
process . . . by contributing to the marketplace of competing 
ideas." 10 2
Justice Brennan's commitment to preserving free speech led him to
write, "None of us, lawyer or layman, teacher or student in our society
must ever feel that to express a conviction, honestly and sincerely
maintained, is to violate some unwritten law of manners 
or decorum."' 0 3
In Hill, Justice Kennedy-who has assumed Brennan's role as defender
of the First Amendment-used the power of a dissenting opinion to
express his convictions, honestly and sincerely, as both a lawyer and a
teacher.
The potential educational power of the opinion can also be
determined by considering the passages that Justice Kennedy chose to
read when he delivered his Hill dissent from the bench.10 4 He carefully
used excerpts that could express to a broad audience the most basic
principles of free speech theory that the First Amendment exists to
protect. In other words, he wanted people to know the boundaries of
100. See generally CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, ITS FOUNDATION, METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS: AN
INTERPRETATION 68 (Garden City Publishing 1936) (1928) ("A dissent in a court of
last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future
day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting
judge believes the court to have been betrayed."); William 0. Douglas, The Dissent:
A Safeguard of Democracy, 32 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 104 (1948); William H.
Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: Past and Present, 59 A.B.A. J. 361, 363 (1973) ("A
dissent in a constitutional case ... is an appeal to present and future brethren to see
the light.").
101. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST.
33, 36-39 (1994).
102. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427,
435 (1986).
103. Id. at 437.
104. The recordings of the opinion announcements in the case are available at
http://www.oyez.org, case number 98-1856.
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their constitutionally protected freedom of speech. First, he offered the
following analogy:
If, just a few decades ago, a State with a history of
enforcing racial discrimination had enacted a
statute like this one, regulating "oral protest,
education, or counseling" within 100 feet of the
entrance to any lunch counter, our predecessors
would not have hesitated to hold it was content
based or viewpoint based. 10
According to Kennedy, the First Amendment does not excuse the
Court from "apply[ing] the same structural analysis when the speech
involved is less palatable to it."' 10 6 Justice Kennedy invoked memories of
a period in American history plagued by intolerance in order to expose
the intolerance of the modem Court's decision in Hill. 
107
Kennedy further sought to reiterate his objection to what he
believed was the majority's condoning of restrictions on speech with
which the Court disagreed. He did so by considering what would happen
"[u]nder the most reasonable interpretation of Colorado's law, if a
speaker approaches a fellow citizen within any one of Colorado's
thousands of disfavored-speech zones and chants in praise of the
Supreme Court and its abortion decisions."' 08 The answer was simple,
stated Kennedy: "I should think there is neither protest, nor education,
nor counseling."' 0 9 This was a very dangerous path for the Court to take.
It was a path that was inconsistent with the First Amendment's
105. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 767 (2000).
106. Id. at 767 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (alteration added). Justice Stevens did
respond to Kennedy's analogy, but only by drawing on his own civil rights analogy
that hypothesized about a law that was very different to the Colorado law: "A
statute making it a misdemeanor to sit at a lunch counter for an hour without
ordering food would also not be 'content based' ...." 530 U.S. at 724.
107. This passage of Kennedy's dissent supports my conclusion, made below,
that for Justice Kennedy this was primarily a free speech case, not a decision about
abortion rights. It does not take into account the provisions in the Colorado law that
directed it towards abortion-related issues. Kristen G. Cowan, The Tailoring of
Statutory Bubble Zones: Balancing Free Speech and Patients' Rights, 91 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 385, 413 (2001).
108. Hill, 530 U.S. at 769 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (alteration added).
109. Id.
protection against viewpoint discrimination. As Kennedy went on to
explain:
If the opposite message is communicated, however,
a prosecution to punish protest is warranted. The
antispeech distinction also pertains if a citizen
approaches a public official visiting a health care
facility to make a point in favor of abortion rights.
If she says, 'Good job, Governor,' there is no
violation; if she says, 'Shame on you, Governor,'
there is. 10
In his dissenting opinion-which Kennedy did not join-Justice
Scalia referred to the Hill decision as part of the Court's "whatever-it-
takes proabortion jurisprudence.""' This is because the Colorado law
was aimed at antiabortion protesters. Employing the "persuasion• • , ,,1 1213
principle, Scalia reasoned that while Roe v. Wade"13 still stood, the
ability of individuals to oppose abortion was limited to the exercising of
their First Amendment right to attempt to change the minds of pregnant
women on an individual basis.114 Scalia was additionally critical of the
chilling effect of the Court's decision. Colorado defended the law as a
means for ensuring the safety of persons entering "health care
facilities,""' to which Scalia responded that the law could not possibly
accomplish this goal because the imposition of an eight-foot zone would
be least likely to dissuade from expressive activities those most likely to
threaten the safety of individuals. "[B]ullhorns and screaming from eight
feet away will serve their purposes well,"' 6 he wrote. Instead, those
who might choose not to express their antiabortion views for fear of
110. Id.
111. Id. at 762 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112. This principle states that the way to combat speech with which you
disagree is not to censor it but instead to offer a competing opinion-an alternative
perspective designed to persuade your audience that the position expressed by your
interlocutor (or opponent) needs to be reconsidered. See David A. Strauss,
Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 334, 354
(1991).
113. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
114. Hill, 530 U.S. at 762-63 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 763.
116. Id. (alteration added).
CIVIC ED UCA TOR2008]
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
prosecution would be the same people "who would accomplish their
moral and religious objectives by peaceful and civil means .... ,117 In
this respect, Scalia concluded, the Court's decision represented a grave
threat to the First Amendment.
1 8
Frank Colucci places his analysis of Kennedy's opinion in Hill
into a broader discussion of the Justice's abortion jurisprudence.
"Although nominally a free speech case," states Colucci, "Kennedy uses
his opinion in Hill to explicate his view of the moral nature of the
abortion decision under the Constitution, and the extent to which both
government and other individuals have the liberty to influence that
decision." 119  To be sure, Kennedy does try to achieve this goal.
However, his opinion should not be described as only "nominally" about
freedom of speech.
Hill was decided on the same day, in 2000, as Stenberg v.
Carhart,120 in which the Court struck down a Nebraska ban on so-called
"partial-birth" abortions. Kennedy's dissent in this case suggested to
many observers that his support for abortion rights had weakened since
the famous 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,121 in which
he joined Justices O'Connor and Souter to create the decisive joint
opinion maintaining the "central holding" of Roe. As I have argued
elsewhere, this overlooks the Justice's belief in the importance of. .. 122
individual responsibility. In Stenberg, Kennedy took care to explain
that as individual as the decision to abort a fetus might be, it is not a
decision without consequences for parties other than the pregnant
woman. Kennedy's understanding of the nature and boundaries of the
right originally articulated in Roe reflects his belief that the woman must
recognize that this affects her constitutionally protected liberty. Kennedy
117. Id.
118. Id. at 763-64.
119. FRANK J. COLUCCI, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE ANTHONY KENNEDY
150 (April 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame) (on file
with author). Cf Linda Greenhouse, Court Rules That Governments Can't Outlaw
Type of Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at Al, A26 ("Justice Scalia and
Justice Kennedy read their impassioned dissenting opinions in the courtroom.., for
more than half an hour, making clear that this First Amendment debate was in many
respects a proxy for the court's ongoing abortion debate").
120. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
121. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
122. KNOWLES, supra note 1, at chapter five.
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also wrote an emphasis on personal responsibility into his dissent in Hill.
However, it is clear that he considered this case to be about the First
Amendment, not abortion. Any other conclusion runs contrary to the
principles of free speech that Kennedy defended in both Johnson and
Rosenberger.
At the beginning of his dissent in Hill, Kennedy noted, "the
Court's decision conflicts with the essence of the joint opinion in
,,123
[Casey]. He returned to the subject of Casey in the last section of the
opinion, explaining why the Court's decision violated the understanding
of individual liberty for which both Casey and the First Amendment
stand. The only passage that he quoted from the 1992 decision was the
following:
[Abortion] is an act fraught with consequences for
others: for the woman who must live with the
implications of her decision; for the persons who
perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse,
family, and society which must confront the
knowledge that these procedures exist, procedures
some deem nothing short of an act of violence
against innocent human life; and, depending on
one's beliefs, for the life or potential life that is
aborted.
124
This is the essence of Kennedy's view that the decision whether
or not to have an abortion is a decision that, while constitutionally
protected, is part of a liberty that the individual must exercise
responsibly. In Hill, the focus of Kennedy's opinion is freedom of
speech, because providing women with information about views on
abortion fundamentally contributes to their ability to responsibly exercise
their liberty.
Listening to Justice Kennedy read excerpts of his Hill dissent,
one is struck by the increased measure of passion with which he spoke
the words of the entire final paragraph of his opinion. When he said this
was a case involving individuals seeking to express their opinions about
what was, in their view, "a grievous moral wrong," one cannot help but
123. 530 U.S. at 765 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (alteration added).
124. Id. at 791 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 852) (alteration added).
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think that this was a view he shared. 125  Indeed, one can criticize
Kennedy's inclusion in his opinion of a lengthy quotation from a
woman's testimony, before the Colorado State Senate, about the extent to
which her decision not to have an abortion was influenced by the receipt
of anti-abortion literature from a clinic protester. Kennedy merely tipped
his hat to the possibility that one could undoubtedly find "women who
would testify that abortion was necessary and unregretted. 1 26 However,
such criticism misses the most important point of Kennedy's dissent in
Hill-that "speech makes a difference."'
' 27
CONCLUSION
When the government seeks to restrict expressive freedom based
on the viewpoint of the speaker, Justice Kennedy often votes to strike
down the action on the grounds that it constitutes discrimination in
violation of the First Amendment's protection of free speech. In this
respect, he has a decidedly libertarian understanding of the first provision
of the Bill of Rights. Indeed, his libertarianism extends to most cases
involving free speech. In terms of the jurisprudential legacy of the
Rehnquist Court, this is significant because Kennedy frequently had the
opportunity to write his libertarian views into opinions that spoke for a
majority of his colleagues; there is no reason to expect this to change
with regard to the Roberts Court.
As I have argued in this article, however, the importance of
Kennedy's First Amendment jurisprudence cannot be fully appreciated
simply by labeling it as 'libertarian.' In order to understand his
passionate defense of freedom of expression, we need to examine the
goal that he seeks to achieve through the opinions he writes in this area
of the law. The goal that Kennedy pursues-civic education-is
particularly evident in cases involving viewpoint discrimination. In three
125. Id. at 792.
126. Id. at 790.
127. Id. Cf Jamin B. Raskin & Clark L. LeBlanc, Disfavored Speech About
Favored Rights: Hill v. Colorado, the Vanishing Public Forum and the Need for an
Objective Speech Discrimination Test, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 179, 224-25 (2001)
(arguing that the inclusion of the testimony does not mean that Kennedy thought this
view was "correct," but rather that it was evidence that abortion protesters' speech
could be influential).
Wol. 6
such cases-Texas v. Johnson, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., and Hill v. Colorado-that spanned Kennedy's time on the
Rehnquist Court, the Justice authored opinions that passionately
defended the right of the people to engage in responsible and tolerant
expression of views that the Constitution protects.
In the most public expression of his commitment to civic
education, Justice Kennedy reminded the students participating in the
first Dialogue on Freedom that "[g]overnments are most dangerous when
they try to tell people what to think." 128 The analysis above has shown
that this extra-judicial statement of Kennedy's belief in expressive
freedom has found judicial manifestation in his Court writings. This
serves the important civic educational purpose of ensuring that rational,
tolerant individuals are able to think for, and to express, themselves.
After all, the alternative is to have the government tell us what to think
by selecting the views that it considers "desirable." This is not consistent
with the principles underlying the First Amendment, and has little or no
civic educational value.
Justice Kennedy has said that freedom is something that "lives in
the consciousness of people."
129 Its "work," though, "is never done";1
30
as Kennedy reminded the American Bar Association in 2007, "the work
of freedom has just begun.",1 31 For the work of freedom of expression to
continue, the individuals for whom the First Amendment exists must be
free to engage in educational and enlightening dialogues on the diversity
of topics upon which they hold, and form views. Otherwise, says
Kennedy, the government will indeed be telling us what to think.
128. Goldstein & Lane, supra note 35 at A17 (alteration added).
129. Supra note 49.
130. Kennedy speech, supra note 72.
131. Tony Mauro, Justice Kennedy to ABA: 'The Work of Freedom Has Just
Begun', LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 14, 2007, at 1; http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id
=
1186996023650.
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"I agree that the flag holds a lonely "I agree that the flag holds a lonely
place of honor in an age when place of honor in an age when
absolutes are distrusted and hard absolutes are distrusted and
truths are burdened by unneeded [simple] truths are burdened by
apologetics." unneeded apologetics."
"Though symbols often are what "Though symbols often are what
we ourselves make of them, the we ourselves make of them, the
flag is constant in expressing flag is constant in expressing
beliefs all Americans share, beliefs beliefs Americans share, beliefs in
in law and peace and that special law and peace and that freedom
freedom which sustains the human which sustains the human spirit."
spirit."
"whether or not he could "whether or not he could
appreciate the enormity of the appreciate the enormity of the
offense he gave with such offense he gave, the fact remains
vengeful insolence, the fact that his acts were speech, in both
remains that his acts were speech, the technical and the fundamental
in both the technical and the meaning of the Constitution."
fundamental meaning of the
Constitution."
Table 1: Passages from the first and final versions of Justice
Kennedy's concurrence in Texas v. Johnson (the changes are indicated
in bold type)'
32
132. Supra note 67, HAB-LOC.
